

‘The Butcher of Baghdad’: US Press Hyper-personalization of the US-led Invasion of Iraq

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This paper explores the discursive construction, in major US newspapers, of Saddam, with the aim of answering the research question: How was Saddam discursively constructed during the US-led invasion? In order to explore this construction, an integrative combination of CL and DHA to CDA has been employed. Through the CL techniques, the collocates were derived for the query word: Saddam. These collocates were then categorised according to their semantic meaning to pinpoint the main thematic patterns so that a further examination, designed to highlight the predicational and nominalional strategies used around the query words (nodes), could be carried out. This is followed by presenting the main recurring predicational and nominalional themes, which demonstrate how is Saddam is talked about and constructed in the US press corpus. The findings shows that Saddam was represented negatively. The negative representation and devaluation of Saddam in the US press is expressed overtly, in terms of the frequency of his name and the strength of the negative attributes. Saddam was the focus in the build-up to the war as well as during the invasion.

Key words: *Saddam, vilification, criminalisation, Hitlerisation, al Qaeda, threat*

1.1 Introduction

The so-called war on terror period is considered a speech intensive as the amount of speeches delivered before, during and after the attack were never been that intensive. Neither the first Gulf war or the NATO’S military operation in the Balkans have witnessed that extent of media attention (Mral, 2006, p. 25). Part of this on-going discourse was the war built-up and the war on Iraq in which various arguments were developed over it. The U.S. officials and allies repeatedly asserted that Saddam’s possess and develops weapons of mass destruction which poses a threat to the international community as well as the allegation of Iraq’s link to Al Qaeda through aiding, harbouring and training members of al Qaeda. Such rhetoric of the US officials were echoed in the news press reinforcing the preferential version of events which sometimes

fell far short to live up to its responsibilities and to the journalistic standards of providing the competing ideas about events for the public so that they can make an informed decision (McLeod, 2009, p. 113). Therefore, it is the aim of this study to examine how the media communicated what the US officials wanted to tell their public and how the media acted an instrument through the selective shaming of the enemy state through the overreliance on the statements of the government spokesmen which in turn facilitated the invasion.

1.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

1.2.1 *Data selection, collection and description: building a corpus*

The collection and selection of data for the current study were based on four criteria: availability, coverage, specific discourse concentration, and periods of time. The availability criterion was determined by the availability of US newspapers in the LexisNexis¹ database. With regard to the coverage criterion, the 'Major US Newspapers' (see Table 1) were chosen. The reason behind this selection is that the 'Major US Newspapers' shown in Table 1, according to LexisNexis website, are among the top 50 newspapers in circulation in US² as well as they are already categorised and named under such label in LexisNexis which makes it easy to access and download.

¹ www.nexis.com

² <https://www.nexis.com/results/shared/sourceInfo.do?csi=307574>

No	Major US Newspapers
1	Daily News (New York)
2	Journal of Commerce
3	Los Angeles Times
4	Newsday (New York)
5	Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
6	St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)
7	Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN)
8	Tampa Bay Times
9	The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
10	The Baltimore Sun
11	The Buffalo News (New York)
12	The Christian Science Monitor
13	The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK)
14	The Denver Post
15	The Hartford Courant
16	The New York Post
17	The New York Times
18	The Orange County Register
19	The Philadelphia Daily News (PA)
20	The Philadelphia Inquirer
21	The Tampa Tribune (Florida)
22	The Washington Post
23	USA Today

Table 1: The major US newspapers

With regards to the discourse concentration, the US press discourse of the US- led invasion period, one week earlier before the war till the ‘mission accomplished’ announced by Bush, was considered.

In order to avoid irrelevant documents when compiling the US- led invasion corpora specific query words were developed as follows:

Iraq! OR Saddam Hussein OR Saddam AND US OR America! OR United States

The exclamation mark (!) acts as a wildcard for searching the word variation, because it finds the root of words and all the letters that are added to it. For instance, searching for ***Iraq!*** will retrieve all the articles that contain ***Iraq, Iraqi and Iraqis***. The AND connector is used to look for words that are far apart from one another in the same article, whereas OR is used to find documents that have either or both of the words linked by the connector OR.

Table 2 shows the number of articles retrieved from the query words specified for each period for the US corpora and sub-corpora.

War	Period	Major US Newspapers Corpora	No of Words
US-led invasion	12/03/2003- 01/05/2003	11264 articles	9,223,117

Table 2: The number of articles retrieved from the UK and US newspapers

1.2.2 Methodological Approach

The methodology used for this study is the combination of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis represented by Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). With a corpus of over nine million words, it would have been impossible to examine the data manually. Thus, various corpus linguistics tools were used as a method of triangulation to achieve better results. The frequency analysis was used to direct the researcher's attention to particular peaks or plunges in the data that might lead to something of interest. This was followed by the examination of the collocations of the words in question. The concordance lines of these words were then expanded to enable the researcher to examine the whole context. These three tools served to reduce subjectivity as well as to allow more patterns of interest to be marked up. Similarly, DHA has various strategies that can be employed to answer different research questions as shown in Table 3. I began by using the CL more quantitatively through deriving frequencies and collocates, as the research progresses the approach became qualitative where the concordances lines (context) of these collocates are looked at into more details to identify Wodak and Meyer's (2016) DHA's predicational, referential and argumentative strategies as well as categorising the themes according to their semantic meaning to see how the query word under question is talked about and referred to.

Strategy	Objective	Devices
NOMINATION	discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions	membership categorisation devices, deictics, anthroponyms etc. tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro parte) verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc.
PREDICATION	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (positively or negatively)	(stereotypical) evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, oppositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns collocations comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implicatures etc.
ARGUMENTATION	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	topoi (formal or content-related) fallacies
PERSPECTIVISATION	positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	deictics direct, indirect or free indirect speech quotation marks, discourse markers/particles metaphors animating prosody etc.
INTENSIFICATION OR MITIGATION	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic status of utterances	diminutives or argumentatives (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctions, hesitations, vague expressions etc. hyperboles, litotes indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion) verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc

Table 3 A selection of discursive strategies

1.3 Saddam's themes

In order to see how the word frequency for 'Saddam' was distributed over the seven weeks (Week 0 - Week 7)³, the number of times the word appears was calculated (see Figure 1). From Figure 1, it can be clearly seen that the discourse on Saddam increased in size in Week 0, reaching a peak in Week 1. Another increase can be seen in Week 4, in which the highest frequency of all weeks is recorded. In this section the main increases and decreases in the frequency of 'Saddam' are explained by means of collocates as will be seen in this section.

³ Week 0-Week 7 is the period from 12/03/2003 to 01/05/2003. I numbered the first week '0' to indicate that the war had not yet started, while Week 7 is when Bush announced that the mission had been accomplished.



Figure 1 Frequency of the use of 'Saddam' during the US-led invasion

Having calculated the frequency, the collocates⁴ of Saddam were then derived in the whole corpus. In view of the large number of collocates that occurred, in order to see how Saddam was talked about in those weeks, only those collocates with five frequencies and above were selected. The collocates were derived for each week and had their concordance lines checked for more context to identify the main semantic topics, with the exception of week 7, as there were no collocates of statistical significance in this particular week, as shown in Table 4.

Week	Saddam's Collocates
Week 0	Saddam, anti, cling, comply, confrontation, defiant, disarm, disarmed, disarming, Hussein, oust, ousting, poses, pro, refuses, remove, removing, rid, sons, strongman, ultimatum, unconditional
Week 1	wage, undermine, ultimatum, topple, survived, strongman, sons, ruthless, rid, removing, remove, removal, regime, pro, president, possesses, overthrown, overthrow, ousting, oust, numbered, minions, loyal, lieutenants, leave, leader, inner, importance, Hussein, henchmen, footage, expired, exile, elite, doomsday, disarming, disarm, dictator, depose, defiant, deadline, anti
Week 2	Saddam, dictator, Fedayeen, grip, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, oust, ousting, overthrow, overthrown, paramilitary, portrait, president, pro, regime, reign, removing, rid, scrawled, topple, uprising
Week 3	Saddam, airport, alive, anti, ashbal, attributed, canal, consists, cousin, Fedayeen, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, Majeed, militia, oust, overthrow, palace, palaces, posters, pro, regime, rid, sons, topple, toppled
Week 4	Saddam, ace, alive, ancestral, anti, belonged, birthplace, bronze, chanted, collapse, collapsed, crumble, crushed, dead, deposed, dictator, dictatorship, downfall, enclave, escaping, fall, Fedayeen, Firdos, foot, giant, glad, gleefully, gone, hate, hates, henchmen, hey, hiding, hometown, husayn, Hussein, likeness, loyal, loyalist, loyalists, mural, murdered, murderous, nightmare, oust, ousted, ousting, overthrow, overthrowing, persecuted, portrait, post, posters, pro, prop, purportedly, Qusai, Qusay, regime, reign, remnants, repression, rid, routed, rule, slum, slums, smacked, sons, spades, statue, statues,

⁴ Following Baker et al. (2013, p. 37), a statistical measure of a significance threshold was considered that combines a mutual information score (MI) ≥ 3 with a log-likelihood score, which should be at least ≥ 6.63 . The window span is restricted to ± 5 around the node (the query word).

	statute, stronghold, strongman, tearing, thug, Tikrit, Tikriti, topple, toppled, toppling, tore, tyrant, Uday, whereabouts
Week 5	Saddam, Hussein, statue, ousted, toppled, deposed, toppling, spades, slum, henchmen
Week 6	Saddam, Hussein, birthday, toppled, deposed, anti, dinar, interrogators

Table 4 Collocates of Saddam in US-led invasion

An examination of the collocates and their concordance lines in Weeks 0 and 1 revealed that the discourse was mainly about the build-up to the war and the war itself. In Week 0 Saddam was depicted as posing a threat, possessing WMD and not complying with UN resolutions. He was given a final opportunity to comply when the UN passed a new resolution demanding immediate and unconditional disarmament and when he was issued with an ultimatum by Bush: get out of Iraq or face war. The main focus in week 1, on the other hand, is on the launch of the US invasion. As shown by the collocates, the facts of the build-up to the war and the war itself explain the increase in the frequency in weeks 0 and 1, when there were many mentions of and references to Saddam.

In week 3, the spotlight was on the battle for Saddam's international airport, which ended with the US capturing it, and speculations regarding Saddam's fate and whether he had survived the bombings, as well as the search for his whereabouts and his palaces. Week 4, in which the highest frequencies were found, has been seen as the turning point in the war, with the symbolic toppling of the forty-foot high bronze statue of Saddam in Baghdad, an historic event which indicated an end to his tenure. Weeks 5 and 6 also contain reports about the toppling of Saddam and the search for his whereabouts.

Figure 2 shows the main discourses on Saddam, from one week prior to the US-led invasion until the moment Bush announced 'mission accomplished' in week 7. The categorisation of the discourse themes (see sections 1.3.1- 1.3.5) was accomplished by categorising the collocates automatically and manually using Wmatrix, according to their semantic meaning in context: for instance, all the collocates that had a crime-related meaning were put under the theme of criminalisation (see section 1.3.2) and similarly for the rest of the themes. Owing to space limitations, only some of the themes in Figure 2 are explained.




Figure 2 Encapsulation of the widespread discourses on Saddam in the US-led invasion

1.3.1 *The Theme of the Vilification of Saddam*

One of the strategies to justify the war on Iraq employed by the US press was to present the war as a binary event involving opposites. This was done by dividing the world into two camps, i.e. “[T]he placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite” (Burke, 1969, p. 403). The use of such binaries, according to many studies, functions to “engender and reinforce unequal relations among objects”; the two positions do not have a “peaceful coexistence”, but operate as a “violent hierarchy” (Derrida, 1981, p. 41) or as a “struggle for predominance”. The two positions are juxtaposed – one is the right position, the other is the wrong one (Carr and Zanetti, 1999, p. 324) .

Therefore, one of the ways in which Saddam was vilified is through the good/evil binary. Such a dichotomy, according to Lazar and Lazar (2004, p. 227), “promotes ‘satanisation’ of the enemy...and a legitimisation of unlimited escalations of violence to the point of extermination of the evil Other” (Cited in Cherry *et al.*, 2015, p. 32). Through this strategy, the enemy’s moral order is deconstructed and stripped of everything good until it becomes an ethical responsibility to put an end to such an evil.

The vilification was accomplished through a lexical reiteration of the word evil itself or other words of same nature, or through defining evil through a series of criminal actions committed by Saddam:

1. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and catalogues what happens to **Saddam's** enemies: "electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape. If this is not **evil**, then **evil** has no meaning."

Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday

2. But Saddam Hussein represents a marriage of **evil** with technology. He has already used poison gas. He has developed biological weapons. He once was developing a nuclear weapons programme and maybe still is.

The Washington Post, March 20, 2003 Thursday

Similarly, in example 3 below, the world has been divided into two camps. There is the good American camp, whose aim is to liberate the Iraqi people and make humanitarian efforts, and the evil camp, represented by Saddam's savage rule, under which the Iraqi people have suffered and been terrorised. This method creates a collective illusion: audiences are guided to think in a particular way by the realities that are constructed for them in the press. They are given little opportunity to develop and arrive at their own conclusions. In this regard, Edelman (1971, p. 65) says that in times of uncertainty, confusion and anxiety people become impatient to be provided with explanation and political order that explains the nature of the threat and polices that encounter such a threat.

3. In Iraq, the lines between **good** and **evil** are clear. Americans should have no doubts about this undertaking. This war is **one of history's great humanitarian efforts**. We are in the process of **freeing an entire country from one of the world's most savage regimes**. That will become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to hail the **Americans as their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by Saddamites**.

Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday

The justness of America is also shown in the deployment of binaries on the 'sunny' side in contrast to the dark side, with Americans obviously being on the side of right, which is the sunny side and implying that Iraq is on the dark side as shown in example 4.

4. A lot of people feel guilty for enjoying the war. After all, some terrible things are happening. But worse things would happen if America failed to rid the world of Saddam. **This time, right and might are on the same side. And there is something undeniably enjoyable about being on the sunny side of an uneven struggle between good and evil.**

Daily News (New York) March 30, 2003, Sunday

Furthermore, the war was not constructed as being a religious war - the '**Crusaders** and **Jews** against a **Muslim ruler**', as Saddam and Osama bin Laden wanted to depict it. It was constructed a war solely against Saddam, because of his wrongdoings and the threat he posed

to the international community by possessing WMDs. It could be argued that the distinction between Islam, Arabs and Saddam was made in order to isolate Saddam and to ensure that any Muslim or Arab sympathisers were not given a religious cause to rally round or any reason to see the war as a holy undertaking.

5. Also, we mustn't forget that some of the countries supporting us against Saddam Hussein are, indeed, Arab and Muslim. Fanatics like Osama bin Laden would love nothing better than to be able to cast the campaign against Hussein as a religious war, the **'Crusaders and Jews' against a Muslim ruler**. This, they must not be allowed to do: Hussein's religion (or lack of it) has nothing to do with his reign of terror or his accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. Our quarrel with Saddam Hussein is because he is simply an evil and dangerous man **who threatens the peace and security of the world - especially his predominately Muslim neighbors in the Middle East**.

The Denver Post March 20, 2003 Thursday

Some 'Arabs and Muslims' were classified as being supportive of US actions against this evil, and this gave additional weight to the idea that the war was being fought against Saddam alone. All the differences between Arabs, Muslims and the US were erased in order to show that they formed a united front and were facing the same enemy who was threatening his "Muslim neighbors".

1.3.2 The Theme of Criminalisation: An 'Other' Saddam

One important theme that emerged from the predicational strategy employed in the US press is the criminalisation of Saddam by reporting his constructed past and present political wrongdoings. This sort of criminalisation, according to Lazar and Lazar (2004, p. 231), triggers and ensure a moral responsibility on the part of the world leading countries to act against the wrongdoings of the perpetrator. The simplest way of criminalising Saddam was through the use of crime-related lexicals, as reflected in the US press's use of collocates such as 'the butcher of Baghdad', 'genocidal', 'murderer', 'murderous', 'thug', 'brutality', 'torture', 'savagery', 'his many crimes', 'his gang', 'his two murderous sons', 'exterminated by Saddam', 'slaughtered by Saddam', 'persecuted by Saddam', 'atrocities committed by Saddam'.

The criminalisation was also realised through what Fowler (1991, p. 85) calls an 'over-lexicalisation' strategy, in which the excessive use of quasi- synonymous words is employed. The criminal actions attributed to Saddam were therefore referred to repeatedly in the press

discourse, with synonymous or near-synonymous lexicals, whether in the form of verbs, nouns or adjectives, being used. These collocates can either be found appearing one after another in a single sentence, paragraph or article, or in different articles in different newspapers – this has a cumulative effect, creating an association between Saddam and criminal or demonic acts in the reader's mind.

6. The men **had been jailed, beaten and had their houses burned** to the ground under Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's **brutal** regime.

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

7. The whole family was **horribly persecuted** by Saddam Hussein, with many members **murdered or disappeared**.

The Philadelphia Inquirer April 2, 2003 Wednesday

The criminal actions were also depicted through the narration of horrific stories about civilians, in a strategy that van van Dijk (1995, p. 156) refers to as 'concretization' where the enemy wrongdoings are accentuated by describing such dreadful acts in concrete, and in detail, visualisable and memorisable words (see example 71-72). By means of this strategy, the audience can be linked to the experience of the victims. Some stories by exiled Iraqis who had fled from the Saddam regime were cited, some were by Iraqi civilians who had suffered under the regime, and some were stories about those who did not make it and consequently were murdered. The stories were about children, woman and old men as well as young people. Many such stories appeared in the press both before and after the invasion to construct a narrative describing Saddam's cruelty and atrocities against his own people as well as to drum up public support for the build-up and the invasion phases of the war.

8. Kubba, [...] can tell harrowing stories about his treatment at the hands of Hussein's secret police: **electric shock torture, daily beatings, cigarette burns**. "To force confessions, Saddam's henchmen torture children in front of their parents," Kubba said. **"They rape wives in front of their husbands. They dip people in acid."** Kubba says his family was targeted because they were politically opposed to Hussein, who became Iraq's ruler in the 1970s. He said his father died of brain damage from torture and that some friends were executed. He escaped the country in 1979 only because a government clerk mistakenly stamped his passport.

St. Petersburg Times (Florida) March 24, 2003 Monday

The criminalisation of Saddam was also constructed by linking him to the actions of other individuals. Saddam was seen as being responsible for things those around him had done. This is what Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 53) term 'relationalisation' and sociativisation', i.e. the

construction of individuals based on their relations/association to each other. Example terms include; 'militia', 'paramilitary', 'forces', 'Paramilitaries', 'squads', 'thugs', 'loyalist(s)', 'jihadists', 'mujahid', 'bodyguards', 'followers', 'sympathisers', 'his brutal regime', 'his most brutal henchman', 'a brutal cousin of Saddam Hussein', 'Saddam's brutal loyalists the Fedayeen', 'his thug sons Uday and Qusay', 'his thugs', 'Saddam's henchmen torture children', 'his cousin' and 'chemical Ali'⁵.

Some of these collocates have an obviously negative, crime-related meaning when their literal meaning is examined. 'Thugs', for instance, is defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as "a man who acts violently, especially to commit a crime", and 'henchman' is defined as "someone who does unpleasant or illegal things for a powerful person". Some of the other words used in this case can only be defined from their context. The term, 'Jihadists', on the other hand, has acquired a negative representation in general, and in Saddam's case the term jihadists had already been framed negatively in relation to those who attacked the World Trade Centre on 9/11; it therefore followed that jihadists (specifically Saddam's jihadists) were plotting to attack the United States as can be seen in examples 73 and 74 below.

9. A search of an abandoned training site in Hindiyah, east of Karbala, turned up what was described as an unusually large amount of chemical protection gear. The site appears to have been used to train Palestinians and other non-Iraqis seeking to join **Saddam's jihadists**. At a nearby agricultural compound, coalition forces found several 55-gallon barrels, which tested positive for nerve agents, including sarin and tabun, as well as blistering mustard gas.

The New York Post April 8, 2003, Tuesday

10. The Irish Times Dublin There is no answer to the reality that the United States and Britain have won their war on **Saddam Hussein and his "jihadists."** Deplorable though it was, and doubtful its legitimacy, in the crude calculus of war casualties the death and destruction is far less than envisaged.

The New York Times April 11, 2003 Friday

Relational identification was also used through a referential strategy that named any individual or group of individuals who resisted the invasion a 'Saddamite' or 'Saddamites' - derivative

⁵ **Chemical Ali** is a nickname used for Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin, who used chemical weapons (CW) in Halabja against the Kurdish population. He was captured by the coalition forces in August 2003 and presented for trial over the use of CWs (Garrett, 2017, p. 49).

adjectives of the noun Saddam – those who believed in a ‘Saddamism⁶’ ideology. These referential strategies came to stand for everything negative, and all the constructed criminal acts and Saddam’s wrongdoings could be reduced to just these words. They acquired even more ideological connotations after the fall of Saddam Hussein and came to be used frequently by ordinary people or politicians to exclude, mute and accuse other people, rivals and politicians simply because they opposed their views. They even accused protestors who were asking for changes in the government of being ‘Saddhist’ as a way of silencing them.

11. No **Saddamite** sleeper cells have sprung into action.

Daily News (New York) March 26, 2003, Wednesday

12. That explains why Syria has recently opened its border to **Saddamite** recruits heading for the front and why it has been acting as a conduit for Iraqi military resupply.

Daily News (New York) April 2, 2003, Wednesday

Furthermore, the differentiation between ‘We’ and the other-within was made. To that end, the US was lionised as a liberator of the Iraqi people which had the humanitarian aim of freeing the Iraqis from a ‘savage regime’. The other-within distinction was made by categorising the Iraqi people into those who needed to be liberated on the one hand, and ‘Saddamites’ on the other; the latter were demonised by describing them as ‘shooting people in the back’ - the inference being that they were cowardly and not prepared to fight face to face.

13. This war is one of history’s great humanitarian efforts. We are in the process of freeing an entire country from one of the world’s most savage regimes. That will become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to hail the Americans as their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by **Saddamites**.

Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday

In the same vein, it was shown how the Iraqi people had suffered under the Saddamite ideology, referred to as ‘Saddamite Stalinism’:

14. After more than 30 years of **Saddamite Stalinism**, the people of Iraq are like battered children. They have been taught blind obedience to an abusive father and to love the hand that beats them.

Daily News (New York) April 6, 2003, Sunday

⁶ **Saddamism or (Saddamiyya)** is a political ideology that developed after Saddam Hussein assumed power in 1973. It was a different form of Ba’athism that called for an Iraq-centred Arab world united under Saddamist Ba’athism and eschewing the old Nasserism (Bengio, 1998)

Moreover, the objective of the war was viewed as being not just the removal of Saddam, but the dismantling of all manifestations of Saddamism. This was reflected in the calls for the replacement of the old Iraqi currency that carried pictures of Saddam, and some of the institutions of the Iraqi state.

15. "Whatever it is, it will not be a currency that has Saddam Hussein's picture on it," a senior official said. "We want to make the point that this is not going to be **Saddamism** without Saddam. You have to visibly **kill some institutions.**"

The New York Times March 15, 2003 Saturday

1.3.3 The Theme of Hitlerisation

The Saddam-Hitler metaphor was used during both the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. At first, this analogy was used to signify the brutality of the Iraqi regime in invading another country and annexing it. This was reported as being just what Hitler did when he invaded Czechoslovakia. This metaphor was subsequently used more emphatically in 2003 to describe the Iraqi regime and its brutality against its own people. It was also part of a shift from depicting Iraq as a local bully threatening its neighbours, to a pariah state and WMD carrier that posed a grave danger to the US and the entire world (Berman, 2004, p. 106).

Lakoff and Johnson (2008) say that people and places can become symbols for actions and policy positions. Hitler, therefore according to Reynolds (2015) has become synonymous, to much of the world, to totalitarian dictatorship, evil and symbol of oppression and racism.. Through the 'Hitlerisation'⁷ of an enemy leader, the conflict is not only "personalized and the individual demonised, but it also introduces the concept of 1930s appeasement". Action becomes required in the face of an aggressive and dictatorial protagonist. The war in such cases becomes reduced to a fight against a single individual. As Lakoff (2013, p. 3) states, the "nation" is then "a person": the fight is constructed as being against a person rather than against a group or a country or a particular people.

The analogy between Saddam and Hitler or Stalin was discursively built up in several ways in the US press. The simplest method of doing this was by quoting people who had referred to

⁷ I used the term Hitlerisation to refer to the strategies used to demonize a person through making an association of that person with Hitler's wrongdoings, evil or any other bad characteristics.

Saddam as 'the Hitler of the 21st century', or as 'a modern-day Hitler', and made comments such as 'he is as dangerous as Hitler was', 'We are dealing with Hitler revisited' and 'Hitler No. 2'.

Another way of building up the analogy with Hitler and therefore adding to the negative image of Saddam was to compare his actions to Hitler's tactics in the Second World War: for instance, Saddam's creation of an army of children known as 'Ashbal Saddam' or 'Saddam's Lion Cubs' by taking youngsters from their families and forcing them to join training camps where they killed animals and were taught to use firearms.

16. **The Lion Cubs are cohesive and well-trained,"** said Peter Singer, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution. "[...]. "My guess is that we will see them **follow the model of the Hitler Youth in '45,"** he said.

The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday

17. But experts said U.S. forces can expect more organized and dogged **resistance from the Cubs, similar to the Hitler Youth** in the waning days of World War II. "Ambushes, sniping, hit-and-run tactics are the most likely things we'll see," Singer said..

Daily News (New York) April 3, 2003, Thursday

Furthermore, Saddam's probable end was compared to the deaths of other dictators like Mussolini who was captured and killed by anti-fascist partisans. Comparisons were also made with Hitler's end by reporting that Saddam had ended up running away and hiding in bunkers. This put Saddam in the position Hitler found himself in when he committed suicide and therefore Saddam was expected to do the same.

18. **Mr. Hussein appeared to set the stage for a situation similar to that which confronted Hitler in 1945,** when the might of the Soviet Army bore down on the German dictator in a bunker near the Reichstag in Berlin, **provoking his suicide.**

The New York Times March 19, 2003 Wednesday

Saddam was also likened to Stalin, Mussolini and even Mao through establishing associations and connections based on their charisma and their totalitarian systems of government. It was also alleged that Saddam had a great admiration for Stalin, as shown in the fact that he had apparently read many of Stalin's books, or by describing Saddam's criminal record and comparing it with that of Stalin:

19. the clock would run down for Mr. Hussein and the totalitarian system of government he has built here **on a model he took from Stalin .**

The New York Times March 20, 2003 Thursday

20. Already those forces have been bombarded with hours of allied radio broadcasts and by millions of leaflets proclaiming the futility of fighting for Saddam Hussein, **whose charisma, like that of his hero Stalin, is his cruelty.**

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

21. Known to **admire Josef Stalin**, Saddam has tortured thousands and his wars have killed more than 1 million.

The New York Post March 20, 2003, Thursday

The attitude of the Iraqi population under Saddam was also compared with that of the Germans under Hitler and the Russians under Stalin, which was 'one of complete, unquestioning subservience'; these people were described as being 'cowed by their charismatic leaders'. The Iraqi army and other forces were also constructed in the same way as the armed forces of Hitler and Stalin; they were used to drive other forces into the battlefield and ensure that any unauthorised retreat or surrender faced serious reprisals.

22. The Iraqi system is reminiscent of the political commissars Joseph Stalin used to **intimidate and galvanize the Soviet army** during World War II, with political troops often taking positions behind the regular army in battle and shooting any laggards. Hitler **used a similar system**, with SS and other Nazi Party units stiffening the will of a professional military that had increasing doubts about the war.

The Washington Post March 28, 2003 Friday

Other historical references to World War II were made through comparing the battle of Baghdad to the battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943). The city was besieged by the German army and the battle fought for the city resulted in the Germans being defeated with enormous human losses - some 1.5 million soldiers and civilians died (Hinton, 2009, p. 48). A fear that Baghdad could turn out to be a 'Mesopotamian Stalingrad' or a 'modern Stalingrad', a 'Baghdograd' was expressed in the press. There was an expectation that Saddam would use tactics similar to those that Stalin used against the Nazis and that American forces could encounter resistance from thousands of volunteers willing to fight to death for Saddam; it was argued that this could cause thousands of civilians to die.

23. The other major fear is that U.S. forces could be bogged down in an urban battle that could turn Baghdad into a **modern Stalingrad**

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

24. That would create what one military analyst warned could become a "**Mesopotamian Stalingrad**" -- referring to the World War II battle in which Soviet defenders fought heavily armed German invaders to a stalemate in the streets of Stalingrad and turned the course of the war.

USA TODAY March 13, 2003, Thursday

The toppling of the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square in Baghdad was constructed as a historic moment and a turning point for the Iraqi people, which was then compared to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Omaar (2004, p. 193) states that the statue had no importance in itself, that it had only been erected a year previously and that the toppling had no direct connection to Saddam's ousting from power. The removal of the statue became a key reference point, however, partly because it happened in front of the TV cameras. The event was immediately classified as an historic moment, but this classification needed an explanation: why was such a seemingly simple activity classed as historic? To that end, a direct association was made with the Berlin Wall:

"[T]he imagery of the fall of the Wall is, [...], a specific reference point or snapshot of history, that in this case comes to stand for liberation. And it is not strictly that it operates as a signifier of liberation that can be applied to other events as a lens that colours in a specific way" (Manghani, 2008, p. 60)

25. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld compared the collapse of Mr. Hussein's regime to the **fall of the Berlin Wall** and said Mr. Hussein had taken his place "in the pantheon of failed dictators."

The New York Times April 10, 2003 Thursday

26. Then a scene reminiscent of the **fall of the Berlin Wall** began to unspool - and the Iraqis, like the East Germans before them, found some courage. Somebody produced a sledgehammer and pounded at the massive marble pediment. Somebody else tossed a rope around Saddam's neck to bring him down. Everybody cheered.

Daily News (New York) April 10, 2003, Thursday

In this regard, there has been an abundance of critics writing on the visual framing of the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue⁸. Some accounts, such as that of Fisk (2003), refer to this moment as "the most staged photo-opportunity since Iwo Jima". Similarly, Rall (2003, p. 228) states that the image of toppling the statue is fake. He adds that US military staged the toppling for the advantage of the journalists who were staying in Baghdad's Palestine Hotel across the street where the fall of the statue took place. He adds that the TV have exaggerated

⁸ On April 9th, 2003, following the entry of US troops into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and after Saddam lost his grip on the capital, a crowd of people gathered around the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square and attempted to pull it down using sledgehammers, but they failed. After those futile attempts, a group of US marines succeeded in bringing it down with the assistance of a crane amid the crowd's chants and jubilation. Onlookers started throwing stones, shoes and other objects at the statue before it fell completely. After it fell, a crowd of people stepped onto the statue and dragged the head and other parts into the streets, slapping them with their shoes. Although this was a brief occurrence, it has been a very controversial moment for many analysts and critics.

the size of the crowds. In the same vein, John Loengard, a critic and photo editor quoted in (Friend, 2007, p. 299) was sceptical about this event. He states, “we remember the war by what took place in front of the hotel in Baghdad where all the press was hunkered down”. Other accounts noted that the photos were taken from close range or that they were cropped tightly to avoid showing the real numbers in the jubilant Iraqi crowd. The intention was to show the world that the Americans were liberators and how the Iraqis cooperated with the American soldiers, which was interpreted as a sign of welcome to those American troops.

1.3.4 The Theme of the Link with Al Qaeda

The construct of social identity was evident in the media discourse both in the build-up to and during the war, with sharp differences being drawn between ‘Us’ (positive self-representation) and ‘Them’ (negative other-representation). As Bucholtz and Hall (2004, p. 383) state, in self-representation “salient differences are set aside in favour of perceived or asserted similarities that are taken to be more situationally relevant”. In the context of this research, the differences within the same nation-states/political parties/allies were either put into the background or ignored, and unity and understanding were brought to the fore; by contrast, the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were brought to the foreground and emphasised. This strategy works on an ideological level, because when the differences are erased, they render “some persons or activities... invisible” (ibid.). Furthermore, realities that are “inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (ibid.). As a result, social identities end up being created through language (ibid.). Identity in this case “is a process not merely of discovering or acknowledging a similarity that precedes” certain situation, but also a matter of “inventing similarity and downplaying difference” (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004, p. 371).

Erasing the differences between Iraq/Saddam and al Qaeda and attempts to link them by highlighting their wrongdoings, their presumed similarities, and the hypothetical connections between them was one of the important strategies used in the US press. Iraq/Saddam and al Qaeda were painted in a single brushstroke and constructed as being a united enemy of the US. This hypothetical connection was one of the main justifications for the US invasion. Linking Iraq to the war on terror against al Qaeda that was already in progress meant that there was no need to present further argument in favour of attacking Iraq.

Table 4 shows the number of times Saddam and Iraq occur as strong collocates with the following entries: *Qaeda, Osama, terrorists, terrorist, terrorism, terror*.

Word	Collocates with Saddam	Collocate with Iraq	Occurrence in the whole corpora
Qaeda	30	45	1091
Osama	36	9	447
Terrorists	20	47	1209
Terrorist	26	105	2584
Terrorism	36	130	2434
Terror	28	56	1218

Table 5: The Collocates of the Link to Al Qaeda

Equation of the enemy is realised by 1) showing that both Saddam and al Qaeda share the same goals, such as attacking the United States, 2) using a discourse where the wrongdoings committed by Saddam are linked to similar wrongdoings by al Qaeda, and (3) constructing Saddam as being a threat through harbouring and training al Qaeda members.

27. [Al Qaeda leader] Osama bin Laden and [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein both are **threats** to our country and threats to our world. We have to treat them **the same way**."

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

28. **Several links** between **al Qaeda and Iraq** have been reported previously. * In northern Iraq, an al Qaeda-affiliated group called Ansar al Islam is allegedly plotting suicide attacks on U.S. forces and has allegedly experimented with chemical weapons. Two members of an Afghanistan-based al Qaeda cell were killed this week in a shootout between U.S.

The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday

In the above examples Osama bin Laden and Saddam are both positioned in the same conceptual category and are given equal status with regard to the threat they posed. The use of the connectors 'and', 'both' and 'the same way' have erased all differences between the two entities and both are viewed as posing the same degree of threat to the US and the rest of the world.

29. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and **his terrorist allies** could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest.

The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday

30. The United States launched airstrikes on the stronghold of vicious Islamic extremists with ties to al Qaeda in northern Iraq - aiming to sever the "**sinister axis**" between Saddam Hussein and international terrorists in the early hours of the war

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

Similarly, in examples 98 and 99 above phrases such as 'his terrorist allies' and 'sinister axis' construct the notion that there is a strong relationship between Saddam and the terrorists.

The link between al Qaeda and Iraq/Saddam was elaborated further through references to the role each played in complementing the other, as Hodges (2011, p. 79) states. Thus, whereas Saddam was seen to play the supporting role of 'harbouring', 'supporting', 'contributing', 'giving intelligence', or 'training and sponsoring', al Qaeda played the role of recipient or beneficiary of Saddam's support, as seen in the following examples:

31. Bush says Saddam is **harboring** "Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq."

Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday

32. Washington has accused Saddam of **supporting** terrorism.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 14, 2003 Friday

33. Conroy, 30, of Apalachin, N.Y., reminded the soldiers of what happened Sept. 11, 2001, and told them Saddam "**contributes** to terrorism directly and indirectly, and that's why we're here."

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 19, 2003 Wednesday

34. I believe that the many indirect links -- such as **intelligence contacts, and agreements and training** between Osama bin Laden's group and Saddam Hussein's government -- are too numerous to dismiss.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 23, 2003 Sunday

35. Finally, he said the United States must defend itself from the threat of Iraq-**sponsored** terrorism.

USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday

36. Bush said Iraq **has supported** terrorists, including the al-Qaeda network blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks, and will not disarm so long as Hussein retains power.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 18, 2003 Tuesday

37. Last week, the President said Saddam Hussein and his weapons "are a direct threat to this country, to our people and all free people." Bush added that Saddam **has "trained and financed** . . . al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations."

Philadelphia Inquirer March 12, 2003 Wednesday

38. "Over the years Iraq has provided **safe haven** to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organisation carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans," Bush said.

The Washington Post April 16, 2003 Wednesday

The use of the present perfect tense in the last three examples (36-38): 'has supported', 'has provided safe haven', and 'has trained and financed', indicates that the actions refer to an ongoing process, without referring to a specific time frame. The implication is that such support has been continuous until the time of reporting. These arguments, analogies and characteristics were drawn from earlier situations on which judgment had already been passed and which had become common knowledge in the minds of the public (Capps, 2001, 209). Establishing a link with Abu Nidal, whose name has already been closely correlated with terrorism, builds on a precedent and therefore strengthens the association of Saddam with terrorists.

1.3.5 *The Theme of Threat*

Throughout the corpora the word 'threat' is a collocate with 'Iraq' and 'Saddam'. 'Threat' is mentioned 205 times, with Iraq and Saddam Hussein being depicted variously as an 'urgent threat', a 'direct threat', a 'terrifying threat', a 'real and imminent danger', and with arguments that they 'posed an immediate threat', as suggested in the following examples:

39. And Kristin Kelly, a senior, said: "A few weeks ago, I would have said that I was against the war. Most of all, I would have condemned the haste. But Saddam has one of the most disgusting records of human rights abuses. His use of chemical weapons is even more indiscriminate. **Saddam is a threat to his own country, and a terrifying threat to us.**"

The New York Times March 16, 2003 Sunday

40. He said that in going to war against Iraq -- what some have called America's first preventive war -- the country was responding to a **real and imminent danger, the threat that Saddam might deploy weapons of mass destruction at home, in the region, or in the cities of America.** "Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose is sure," Bush said.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 20, 2003 Thursday

The threat of Saddam was also constructed in the press as being actualised indirectly by a third party: namely, terrorists, who were being provided by Saddam/Iraq with a 'safe haven', 'support and training' or who were 'plotting suicide attacks' against the US.

41. The Bush administration has portrayed Ansar as a **link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein**, saying the Iraqi president has provided support and training to the group.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 23, 2003 Sunday

This sense of the *topos* of threat serves to create, within the in-group, feelings of fear and insecurity, while at the same time vilifying the out-group. In this regard, van Dijk (2005, p. 85) states that the discourse on terror following the 9/11 event became the main argument for introducing more rigorous security policies, which in turn provide added legitimacy for going to war. Since Iraq had already been linked to international terrorism, no further justification seemed to be required. Both the US and Iraq/Saddam have been depicted as affecting the future of the world, but the way the danger of each is constructed is different. The ‘Other’ is constructed as having a deliberate choice, as indicated by the notions ‘poses [...] danger’, ‘brutal states’, or ‘deliver catastrophe to our country and our world’. The US, on the other hand, is depicted as the agent that will prevent this catastrophe from happening to Iraq’s neighbours, the wider world and the USA itself.

Iraq and Saddam were also constructed as being a threat to the entire world and to the neighbouring countries, through the use of phrases like ‘is a threat to the whole’, ‘danger to the world’ and ‘world faced a dual threat’.

42. The similarities were not a coincidence. Bush says Iraq poses the same danger to **the world and the United States** as Osama bin Laden's network.

USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday

The *topoi* of threat and fear were widely used in the 2003 war by both the US press and politicians to influence public opinion and affect the course of the war against Iraq. Many empirical researchers view this strategy, “as a kind of argument used to threaten a target audience with a fearful outcome (most typically that outcome is the likelihood of death) in order to get the audience to adopt a recommended response” (Walton, 1996, p. 304; Walton, 2000, p. 1), or, as Witte puts it, as “a persuasive message that attempts to arouse the emotion of fear by depicting a personally relevant and significant threat and then follows this description of the threat by outlining recommendations presented as effective and feasible in deterring the threat”. According to Witte, Sampson and Liu (cited in Walton, 2000, p. 1), the threat usually consists of “some terrible consequence or harm that will befall the individual for not adopting the recommended response”. The following extracts contain examples of how the sense of danger was used and implied in the US press:

43. We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year or five years the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies

could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now where it arises before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.

The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday

44. As he has argued repeatedly, Bush said the greatest danger of leaving Saddam in power is that he will make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists for attacks on the U.S. "Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety," Bush vowed. "Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed."

Daily News (New York) March 18, 2003, Tuesday

In the above two arguments, Bush argues on the side of going to war by depicting Saddam and Iraq as a threat and positing that deciding not to take action, or 'inaction', as in example 43, or 'leaving Saddam in power', as in example 44, would have dire consequences. The strong possibility that Iraq could 'inflict harm', that it 'could choose the moment of deadly conflict', as in 43, or that its forces could 'appear suddenly in our skies and cities', or that Saddam could 'make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists for attacks on the US' as in 44 is emphasised. Action needed to be taken to ensure that these things did not happen, as shown in the phrases 'We are now acting', 'We choose to meet that threat now'.

In conjunction with the *topos of threat*, the *topos of history* was also used to legitimise the invasion. This is because history has popularly been claimed to provide 'guidance': people study examples from the past and emulate them in the present. From the perspective of discourse and representation, history is invariably used by people claiming to have learned lessons from the past, that it has given them guidance, and that history gives meaning to the contemporary events, actors and processes (Forchtner, 2014, p. 19). Events and personages from the past have consistently been used to justify actions and construct identities in the present.

One of the more widely used *topoi of history* as a teacher is called the 'rhetoric of judging' (Forchtner, 2014, p. 29), in which past wrongdoings committed by an out-group (them) are linked to present actions, with the claim that they are similar to the present and should therefore be avoided. This rhetoric involves excluding 'Our' past wrongdoings - or putting them in the background or silencing them - and problematising the 'Other' through their past so that their actions can be delegitimised.

45. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned. The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapons inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraq regime have failed again and again because we are not dealing with peaceful men. Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people. The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends and it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al Qaeda. The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other.

The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday

46. Saddam Hussein has proven he is capable of any crime. We must not permit his crimes to reach across the world. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He possesses the weapons of mass murder. He agrees -- he agreed to disarm Iraq of these weapons as a condition for ending the Gulf War over a decade ago. The United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1441 has declared Iraq in material breach of its longstanding obligations; demanded once again Iraq's full and immediate disarmament; and promised serious consequences if the regime refused to comply. That resolution was passed unanimously, and its logic is inescapable. The Iraqi regime will disarm itself or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself. Action to remove the threat from Iraq would also allow the Iraqi people to build a better future for their society

The New York Times March 17, 2003 Monday

In the above extracts, many linguistic means are utilised to represent the in-group and the out-group. With regard to nomination and predication strategies, the in-group is depicted through the use of the deictic expressions 'we' and 'our', as well as through the use of many good attributes, such as 'patient', 'honorable', 'diplomacy', 'our good faith', 'our' 'peaceful efforts'; the in-group is also represented as being victims of danger and the use of weapons. In contrast, the other is represented through negative ideological anthroponomy, whether explicitly or implicitly, in words such as 'ploy', 'deception', 'threatened', 'bugged', 'deceived', 'reckless aggression', 'hatred', 'train and harbored terrorists' and 'kill thousands'. In this case, history serves as a teacher that draws attention to mistakes made by the out-group in the past; the

implication is that in order to avoid such mistakes being made in the future an intervention is required that will disarm Saddam and eliminate the threat.




Figure 3: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)

In contrast to the rhetoric of judging, where 'Our' wrong past is excluded and 'their' wrong past is emphasised and linked to the present, a self-critical rhetoric strategy is also utilised to achieve the same purpose: i.e., legitimising the war. This type of rhetoric is called the 'rhetoric of failing', in which the enemy - 'them' - is convicted by their wrong past in the present. However, the lesson to be learned in the present is no longer directed at the out-group but more at the in-group, to which it acts as a warning that the same actions should not be repeated.

47. Bush carefully reviewed the vote in Congress and several United Nations Security Council resolutions that he said formed the legal basis for an attack on Saddam's regime. **He expressed disappointment that the United Nations had failed to agree on a new resolution but concluded: 'The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities so we will rise to ours.'** At worst, the U.N.'s current paralysis risks reducing the modern international organization to the same impotence that its predecessor, the League of Nations, suffered after the 1935 Abyssinian crisis when Italian dictator Benito Mussolini attacked what was by then the only independent state in Africa. The League imposed only tepid economic sanctions against Italy, which Mussolini ignored. By the time that Adolf Hitler superceded the Duce as Europe's most fanatical aggressor, the League was a mere debating society. We would hate to see the same fate befall today's U.N., but the record is not good.

Actions linked to the League of Nations are here identified as lessons the United Nations should have learned. Notably, after Abyssinia was invaded by Mussolini in 1935, no real action was

taken against this invasion by the League of Nations which only imposed economic sanctions against Italy following an appeal for help by the Abyssinians. The sanctions were not effective and did not contain materials that could be vital and influence Italy such as oil; if oil had been included this could have made major effect on Italy. Two members of the League - France and Britain - did not want to have their naval power at risk in the Mediterranean by provoking Mussolini (Britain had two naval bases in the area). The French Prime Minister - Pierre Laval - and the British Foreign Secretary - Samuel Hoare - met to try to end the war and came up with a plan according to which two large areas of Abyssinia would be ceded to Italy and the 'corridor of camels' would be given to the Abyssinians. Furthermore, the southern part of the country was to be allocated to Italian businesses. This plan was accepted by Mussolini, but there was an outcry in Britain. The British government was believed to have betrayed the Abyssinian people, the Foreign Secretary had to resign and the plan was dropped. The plan had shown that two members of the major European were ready to appease and negotiate with Mussolini who invaded another country. With regard to the case under study here, in the above extract a reference is made to the United Nations' failure to agree on a new resolution to oppose Saddam Hussein's regime and, by repeating the mistakes made by the League of Nations in the past, its failure to live up to its responsibilities.




Figure 4: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)

1.4 Conclusion

The negative representation and devaluation of Saddam in the US press is expressed overtly, in terms of the frequency of his name and the strength of the negative attributes. Saddam was the focus in the build-up to the war as well as during the invasion. He was consistently constructed as representing the evil camp in the good-evil binary. He was criminalised in the

press, which recalled his past wrongdoings, assigning him negative attributes. The vilification included comparing Saddam with well-known brutal figures such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao, who had already acquired a bad reputation in the minds of the public. Justifications for the analogy included the claims that Saddam had read books about these figures, alleged similarities between the crimes they had committed, and similarities in their appearance and charisma. Moreover, the history of Saddam's wrongdoings was brought back to the surface to serve the propaganda purpose, and his past was linked to the present to show that he was still a real threat that needed to be confronted. Saddam was also constructed as being an imminent threat to the neighbouring countries, America and the rest of the world because of his alleged possession of WMDs, and because of his connection with al Qaeda, constructing him as harbouring, training and supporting al Qaeda members. This negative representation and the frequent demonization has showed how the US press helped in communicating what the US officials wanted to communicate their agenda to the public.

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